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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
your verdict?" And the juror answered, "It is, but I consented to it
under protest." The court then recorded the verdict and discharged
the jury. W. J. P.
EVIDENCE.
Werner v. Pope, 273 S. W. 92 (Ky. App., 1925).
EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL NOTICE - AUTOMOBILES
Plaintiff, driving an automobile, struck defendant at a crossing and
injured him. A witness testified that plaintiff stopped within three
or four feet after hitting defendant. Defendant excepted to the fail-
ure of the court to instruct the jury that it was plaintiff's duty to
drive at a reasonable rate of speed. Held, such instruction was un-
necessary, as there was no evidence tending to show excessive speed.
The court took judicial notice of the fact, as a matter of common
knowledge, that an automobile cannot ordinarily be operated at a
street comer or elsewhere at a much lower rate of speed than such
as will permit its being stopped within three or four feet. This illus-
trates the tendency of the courts to take judicial notice of many facts
in the construction and operation of the automobile.
Courts have heretofore taken judicial notice of the fact that appli-
cation of the brakes or shutting off the power are usual means of
stopping an automobile, in determining the driver's duty under cer-
tain circumstances (Waking v. Cincinnati 1. & W. R. Co., 72 Ind.
App. 401, 125 N. E. 799) of the fact that snow will gather on the wind-
shield of an automobile being driven during a snowstorm, and that
little progress would be made if it were attempted to keep the wind-
shield entirely clear (Dube v. Sevigne [N. H.] 123 A. 894), of the
fact that the driver of a Ford car is seated three or four feet to the
rear of the radiator and front wheels, in determining whether plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in stopping with the front of his
car on the railroad track, where he could not see the train approaching
until within three or four feet of the track (Wallen v. Mississippi River
& B. T. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 267 S. W. 12), of the fact that economy
in gasoline consumption is largely influenced by the ability and ex-
perience of the chauffeur, the character of the road, the number and
length of stops, etc., in an action for breach of a mileage warranty
(Fleming v. Gerlinger Motorcar Co. et al., 86 Ore. 195, 168 P. 289),
of the fact that the occurrence of a blow-out in the tire of a running
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car impairs the driver's ability to manage the car, in determining
whether excessive speed or a blowrout was the proximate cause of an
accident (Ronning v. State [Wis.], 200 N. W. 394), of the fact that a
blow-out of the front tire of an automobile running fifteen miles an
hour might cause the car to run into a ditch, in determining whether
any cause but defendant's negligence might possibly have caused an
accident (Klein v. Beeten et aL, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N. W. 736), and
of the fact that the speed of an automobile may be changed at differ-
ent points within a distance of a mile, in determining the admissibility
of evidence of a car's average speed for more than a mile before
striking a person (People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400).
But that the judicial notice of the automobile is not unlimited is shown
by the following recent cases, decided in 1920 and 1925, respectively:
Texas Co. v. Brandt et aL, 79 Okl. 97, 191 P. 166, in which the court
refused to take judicial notice that automobiles stopping and starting
at filling stations emit unusual noises and odors which travel from 50
to 125 feet, in a suit to enjoin the construction and operation of a
filling station; Sherwood v. American Ry. Express, 158 La. -, 103
So. 436, in which the court refused to notice the time which would be
required to repair an automobile injured in a collision, in determining
the adequacy of damages. F. W. F.
McLendon v. State, 105 So. 406 (Fla., 1925).
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-EXPERIMENTS-Defend-
ant resisted arrest by an officer, and in the struggle the officer was
fatally wounded by a shot from his own pistol. On trial for murder
in the first degree, defendant contended that the shot occurred acci-
dentally during the struggle. The prosecution maintained that the shot
was premeditated, being fired by defendant after getting some dis-
tance from the officer. No powder marks or burns were found on the
flesh of deceased. Held, paper and cloth targets at which experimental
shots were fired with the pistol which fired the fatal shot and similar
ammunition, at varying distances, to show that if the shot had been
fired as close to deceased as defendant claimed it would have left
powder marks and burns on the flesh of deceased, were not admissible,
unless it were first shown that the targets were similar to human flesh
in texture, vulnerability and susceptibility to powder marks and burns.
Experiments to be admissible in evidence must first be shown to have
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